man sysklogd extracts
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Днес докато си четях man-а на sysklogd попаднах на следната секция. В интерес на истината никога не съм се задълбочавал в нея (поне до днес). Сега моля обърнете внимание на точка номер 5 и на обяснението под нея. Винаги съм обичал хардуерни решения :)
SECURITY THREATS
There is the potential for the syslogd daemon to be used as a conduit for a denial of service attack. Thanks go to John Morrison (jmorriso@rflab.ee.ubc.ca) for alerting me to this potential. A rogue program(mer) could very easily flood the syslogd daemon with syslog messages resulting in the log files consuming all the remaining space on the filesystem. Activating logging over the inet domain sockets will of course expose a system to risks outside of programs or individuals on the local machine.There are a number of methods of protecting a machine:
1. Implement kernel firewalling to limit which hosts or networks have access to the 514/UDP socket.
2. Logging can be directed to an isolated or non-root filesystem which, if filled, will not impair the machine.
3. The ext2 filesystem can be used which can be configured to limit a certain percentage of a filesystem to usage by root only. NOTE that this will require syslogd to be run as a non-root process. ALSO NOTE that this will prevent usage of remote logging since syslogd will be unable to bind to the 514/UDP socket.
4. Disabling inet domain sockets will limit risk to the local machine.
5. Use step 4 and if the problem persists and is not secondary to a rogue program/daemon get a 3.5 ft (approx. 1 meter) length of sucker rod* and have a chat with the user in question.Sucker rod def. — 3/4, 7/8 or 1in. hardened steel rod, male threaded on each end. Primary use in the oil industry in Western North Dakota and other locations to pump ’suck’ oil from oil wells. Secondary uses are for the construction of cattle feed lots and for dealing with the occasional recalcitrant or belligerent individual.
