Tag Archives: gps

Using mobile sensor data to encourage safer driving

Post Syndicated from Grab Tech original https://engineering.grab.com/using-mobile-sensor-data-to-encourage-safer-driving

“Telematics”, a cross between the words telecommunications and informatics, was coined in the late 1970s to refer to the use of communication technologies in facilitating exchange of information. In the modern day, such technologies may include cloud platforms, mobile networks, and wireless transmissions (e.g., Bluetooth). Although the initial intention is for a more general scope, telematics is now specifically used to refer to vehicle telematics where details of vehicle movements are tracked for use cases such as driving safety, driver profiling, fleet optimisation, and productivity improvements.

We’ve previously published this article to share how Grab uses telematics to improve driver safety. In this blog post, we dive deeper into how telematics technology is used at Grab to encourage safer driving for our driver and delivery partners.

Background

At Grab, the safety of our users and their experience on our platform is our highest priority. By encouraging safer driving habits from our driver and delivery partners, road traffic accidents can be minimised, potentially reducing property damage, injuries, and even fatalities. Safe driving also helps ensure smoother rides and a more pleasant experience for consumers using our platform.

To encourage safer driving, we should:

  1. Have a data-driven approach to understand how our driver and delivery partners are driving.
  2. Help partners better understand how to improve their driving by summarising key driving history into a personalised Driving Safety Report.

Understanding driving behaviour

One of the most direct forms of driving assessment is consumer feedback or complaints. However, the frequency and coverage of this feedback is not very high as they are only applicable to transport verticals like JustGrab or GrabBike and not delivery verticals like GrabFood or GrabExpress. Plus, most driver partners tend not to receive any driving-related feedback (whether positive or negative), even for the transport verticals.

A more comprehensive method of assessing driving behaviour is to use the driving data collected during Grab bookings. To make sense of these data, we focus on selected driving manoeuvres (e.g., braking, acceleration, cornering, speeding) and detect the number of instances where our data shows unsafe driving in each of these areas.

We acknowledge that the detected instances may be subjected to errors and may not provide the complete picture of what’s happening on the ground (e.g., partners may be forced to do an emergency brake due to someone swerving into their lane).

To address this, we have incorporated several fail-safe checks into our detection logic to minimise erroneous detection. Also, any assessment of driving behaviour will be based on an aggregation of these unsafe driving instances over a large amount of driving data. For example, individual harsh braking instances may be inconclusive but if a driver partner displays multiple counts consistently across many bookings, it is likely that the partner may be used to unsafe driving practices like tailgating or is distracted while driving.

Telematics for detecting unsafe driving

For Grab to consistently ensure our consumers’ safety, we need to proactively detect unsafe driving behaviour before an accident occurs. However, it is not feasible for someone to be with our driver and delivery partners all the time to observe their driving behaviour. We should leverage sensor data to monitor these driving behaviour at scale.

Traditionally, a specialised “black box” inertial measurement unit (IMU) equipped with sensors such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, and GPS needs to be installed in alignment with the vehicle to directly measure vehicular acceleration and speed. In this manner, it would be straightforward to detect unsafe driving instances using this data. Unfortunately, the cost of purchasing and installing such devices for all our partners is prohibitively high and it would be hard to scale.

Instead, we can leverage a device that all partners already have: their mobile phone. Modern smartphones already contain similar sensors to those in IMUs and data can be collected through the telematics SDK. More details on telematics data collection can be found in a recently published Grab tech blog article1.

It’s important to note that telematics data are collected at a sufficiently high sampling frequency (much more than 1 Hz) to minimise inaccuracies in detecting unsafe driving instances characterised by sharp acceleration impulses.

Processing mobile sensor data to detect unsafe driving

Unlike specialised IMUs installed in vehicles, mobile sensor data have added challenges to detecting unsafe driving.

Accounting for orientation: Phone vs. vehicle

The phone is usually in a different orientation compared to the vehicle. Strictly speaking, the phone accelerometer sensor measures the accelerations of the phone and not the vehicle acceleration. To infer vehicle acceleration from phone sensor data, we developed a customised processing algorithm optimised specifically for Grab’s data.

First, the orientation offset of the phone with respect to the vehicle is defined using Euler angles: roll, pitch and yaw. In data windows with no net acceleration of the vehicle (e.g., no braking, turning motion), the only acceleration measured by the accelerometer is gravitational acceleration. Roll and pitch angles can then be determined through trigonometric manipulation. The complete triaxial accelerations of the phone are then rotated to the horizontal plane and the yaw angle is determined by principal component analysis (PCA).

An assumption here is that there will be sufficient braking and acceleration manoeuvring for PCA to determine the correct forward direction. This Euler angles determination is done periodically to account for any movement of phones during the trip. Finally, the raw phone accelerations are rotated to the vehicle orientation through a matrix multiplication with the rotation matrix derived from the Euler angles (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Inference of vehicle acceleration from the phone sensor data. Smartphone and car images modified from designs found in Freepik.com.

Handling variations in data quality

Our processing algorithm is optimised to be highly robust and handle large variations in data quality that is expected from bookings on the Grab platform. There are many reported methods for processing mobile data to reorientate telematics data for four wheel vehicles23.

However, with the prevalent use of motorcycles on our platform, especially for delivery verticals, we observed that data collected from two wheel vehicles tend to be noisier due to differences in phone stability and vehicular vibrations. Data noise can be exacerbated if partners hold the phone in their hand or place it in their pockets while driving.

In addition, we also expect a wide variation in data quality and sensor availability from different phone models, such as older, low-end models to the newest, flagship models. A good example to illustrate the robustness of our algorithm is having different strategies to handle different degrees of data noise. For example, a simple low-pass filter is used for low noise data, while more complex variational decomposition and Kalman filter approaches are used for high noise data.

Detecting behaviour anomalies with thresholds

Once the vehicular accelerations are inferred, we can use a thresholding approach (see Figure 2) to detect unsafe driving instances.

For unsafe acceleration and braking, a peak finding algorithm is used to detect acceleration peaks beyond a threshold in the longitudinal (forward/backward) direction. For unsafe cornering, older and lower end phones are usually not equipped with gyroscope sensors, so we should look for peaks of lateral (sidewards) acceleration (which constitutes the centripetal acceleration during the turn) beyond a threshold. GPS bearing data that coarsely measures the orientation of the vehicle is then used to confirm that a cornering and not lane change instance is being detected. The thresholds selected are fine-tuned on Grab’s data using initial values based on published literature4 and other sources.

To reduce false positive detection, no unsafe driving instances will be flagged when:

  1. Large discrepancies are observed between speeds derived from integrating the longitudinal (forward/backward) acceleration and speeds directly measured by the GPS sensor.
  2. Large phone motions are detected. For example, when the phone falls to the seat from the dashboard, accelerations recorded on the phone sensor will deviate significantly from the vehicle accelerations.
  3. GPS speed is very low before and after the unsafe driving instance is detected. This is limited to data collected from motorcycles which is usually used by delivery partners. It implies that the partner is walking and not in a vehicle. For example, a GrabFood delivery partner may be collecting the food from the merchant partner on foot, so no unsafe driving instances should be detected.
Figure 2: Animation showing unsafe driving detection by thresholding. Dotted lines in acceleration charts indicate selected thresholds. Map tiles by stamen design.

Detecting speeding instances from GPS speeds and map data

To define speeding along a stretch of road, we used a rule-based method by comparing raw speeds from GPS pings with speeding thresholds for that road. Although GPS speeds are generally accurate (subjected to minimal GPS errors), we need to take more precautions to ensure the right speeding thresholds are determined.

These thresholds are set using known speed limits from available map data or hourly aggregated speed statistics where speed limits are not available. The coverage and accuracy of known speed limits is continuously being improved by our in-house mapping initiatives and validated comprehensively by the respective local ground teams in selected cities.

Aggregating GPS pings from Grab driver and delivery partners can be a helpful proxy to actual speed limits by defining speeding violations as outliers from socially acceptable speeds derived from partners collectively. To reliably compute aggregated speed statistics, a representative speed profile for each stretch of road must first be inferred from raw GPS pings (see Figure 3).

As ping sampling intervals are fixed, more pings tend to be recorded for slower speeds. To correct the bias in the speed profile, we reweigh ping counts by using speed values as weights. Furthermore, to minimise distortions in the speed profile from vehicles driving at lower-than-expected speeds due to high traffic volumes, only pings from free-flowing traffic are used when inferring the speed profile.

Free-flowing traffic is defined by speeds higher than the median speed on each defined road category (e.g., small residential roads, normal primary roads, large expressways). To ensure extremely high speeds are flagged regardless of the speed of other drivers, maximum threshold values for aggregated speeds are set for each road category using heuristics based on the maximum known speed limit of that road category.

Figure 3: Steps to infer a representative speed profile for computing aggregated speed statistics.

Besides a representative speed profile, hourly aggregation should also include data from a sufficient number of unique drivers depending on speed variability. To obtain enough data, hourly aggregations are performed on the same day of the week over multiple weeks. This way, we have a comprehensive time-specific speed profile that accounts for traffic quality (e.g., peak hour traffic, traffic differences between weekdays/weekends) and driving conditions (e.g., visibility difference between day/night).

When detecting speeding violations, the GPS pings used are snapped-to-road and stationary pings, pings with unrealistic speeds, while pings with low GPS accuracy (e.g., when the vehicle is in a tunnel) are excluded. A speeding violation is defined as a sequence of consecutive GPS pings that exceed the speeding threshold. The following checks were put in place to minimise erroneous flagging of speeding violations:

  1. Removal of duplicated (or stale) GPS pings.
  2. Sufficient speed buffer given to take into account GPS errors.
  3. Sustained speeding for a prolonged period of time is required to exclude transient speeding events (e.g., during lane change).

Driving safety report

The driving safety report is a platform safety product that driver and delivery partners can access via their driver profile page on the Grab Driver Application (see Figure 4). It is updated daily and aims to create awareness regarding driving habits by summarising key information from the processed data into a personalised report that can be easily consumed.

Individual reports of each driving manoeuvre (e.g., braking, acceleration, cornering and speeding) are available for daily and weekly views. Partners can also get more detailed information of each individual instance such as when these unsafe driving instances were detected.

Figure 4: Driving safety report for driver and delivery partners using four wheel vehicles. a) Actionable insights feature circled by red dotted lines. b) Daily view of various unsafe driving instances where more details of each instance can be viewed by tapping on “See details”.

Actionable insights

Besides compiling the instances of unsafe driving in a report to create awareness, we are also using these data to provide some actionable recommendations for our partners to improve their driving.

With unsafe driving feedback from consumers and reported road traffic accident data from our platform, we also train machine learning models to identify patterns in the detected unsafe driving instances and estimate the likelihood of partners receiving unsafe driving feedback or getting into accidents. One use case is to compute a safe driving score that equates a four-wheel partner’s driving behaviour to a numerical value where a higher score indicates a safer driver.

Additionally, we use Shapley additive explanation (SHAP) approaches to determine which driving manoeuvre contributes the most to increasing the likelihood of partners receiving unsafe driving feedback or getting into accidents. This information is included as an actionable insight in the driving safety report and helps partners to identify the key area to improve their driving.

What’s next?

At the moment, Grab performs telematics processing and unsafe driving detections after the trip and updates the report the next day. One of the biggest improvements would be to share this information with partners faster. We are actively working on developing a real-time processing algorithm that addresses this and also, satisfies the robustness requirements such that partners are immediately aware after an unsafe driving instance is detected.

Besides detecting typical unsafe driving manoeuvres, we are also exploring other use cases for mobile sensor data in road safety such as detection of poor road conditions, counterflow driving against traffic, and phone usage leading to distracted driving.

Join us

Grab is the leading superapp platform in Southeast Asia, providing everyday services that matter to consumers. More than just a ride-hailing and food delivery app, Grab offers a wide range of on-demand services in the region, including mobility, food, package and grocery delivery services, mobile payments, and financial services across 428 cities in eight countries.

Powered by technology and driven by heart, our mission is to drive Southeast Asia forward by creating economic empowerment for everyone. If this mission speaks to you, join our team today!

References

  1. Burhan, W. (2022). How telematics helps Grab to improve safety. Grab Tech Blog. https://engineering.grab.com/telematics-at-grab 

  2. Mohan, P., Padmanabhan, V.N. and Ramjee, R. (2008).Nericell: rich monitoring of road and traffic conditions using mobile smartphones. SenSys ‘08: Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Embedded network sensor systems, 312-336. https://doi.org/10.1145/1460412.1460444 

  3. Sentiance (2016). Driving behavior modeling using smart phone sensor data. Sentiance Blog. https://sentiance.com/2016/02/11/driving-behavior-modeling-using-smart-phone-sensor-data/ 

  4. Yarlagadda, J. and Pawar, D.S. (2022). Heterogeneity in the Driver Behavior: An Exploratory Study Using Real-Time Driving Data. Journal of Advanced Transportation. vol. 2022, Article ID 4509071. https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/4509071 

FTC Sues Data Broker

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/08/ftc-sues-data-broker.html

This is good news:

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has sued Kochava, a large location data provider, for allegedly selling data that the FTC says can track people at reproductive health clinics and places of worship, according to an announcement from the agency.

“Defendant’s violations are in connection with acquiring consumers’ precise geolocation data and selling the data in a format that allows entities to track the consumers’ movements to and from sensitive locations, including, among others, locations associated with medical care, reproductive health, religious worship, mental health temporary shelters, such as shelters for the homeless, domestic violence survivors, or other at risk populations, and addiction recovery,” the lawsuit reads.

Critical Vulnerabilities in GPS Trackers

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/07/critical-vulnerabilities-in-gps-trackers.html

This is a dangerous vulnerability:

An assessment from security firm BitSight found six vulnerabilities in the Micodus MV720, a GPS tracker that sells for about $20 and is widely available. The researchers who performed the assessment believe the same critical vulnerabilities are present in other Micodus tracker models. The China-based manufacturer says 1.5 million of its tracking devices are deployed across 420,000 customers. BitSight found the device in use in 169 countries, with customers including governments, militaries, law enforcement agencies, and aerospace, shipping, and manufacturing companies.

BitSight discovered what it said were six “severe” vulnerabilities in the device that allow for a host of possible attacks. One flaw is the use of unencrypted HTTP communications that makes it possible for remote hackers to conduct adversary-in-the-middle attacks that intercept or change requests sent between the mobile application and supporting servers. Other vulnerabilities include a flawed authentication mechanism in the mobile app that can allow attackers to access the hardcoded key for locking down the trackers and the ability to use a custom IP address that makes it possible for hackers to monitor and control all communications to and from the device.

The security firm said it first contacted Micodus in September to notify company officials of the vulnerabilities. BitSight and CISA finally went public with the findings on Tuesday after trying for months to privately engage with the manufacturer. As of the time of writing, all of the vulnerabilities remain unpatched and unmitigated.

These are computers and computer vulnerabilities, but because the computers are attached to cars, the vulnerabilities become potentially life-threatening. CISA writes:

These vulnerabilities could impact access to a vehicle fuel supply, vehicle control, or allow locational surveillance of vehicles in which the device is installed.

I wouldn’t have buried “vehicle control” in the middle of that sentence.

GPS Vulnerabilities

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/gps-vulnerabilities.html

Really good op-ed in the New York Times about how vulnerable the GPS system is to interference, spoofing, and jamming — and potential alternatives.

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act included funding for the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Transportation to jointly conduct demonstrations of various alternatives to GPS, which were concluded last March. Eleven potential systems were tested, including eLoran, a low-frequency, high-power timing and navigation system transmitted from terrestrial towers at Coast Guard facilities throughout the United States.

“China, Russia, Iran, South Korea and Saudi Arabia all have eLoran systems because they don’t want to be as vulnerable as we are to disruptions of signals from space,” said Dana Goward, the president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, a nonprofit that advocates for the implementation of an eLoran backup for GPS.

Also under consideration by federal authorities are timing systems delivered via fiber optic network and satellite systems in a lower orbit than GPS, which therefore have a stronger signal, making them harder to hack. A report on the technologies was submitted to Congress last week.

GPS is a piece of our critical infrastructure that is essential to a lot of the rest of our critical infrastructure. It needs to be more secure.

The US Military Buys Commercial Location Data

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/11/the-us-military-buys-commercial-location-data.html

Vice has a long article about how the US military buys commercial location data worldwide.

The U.S. military is buying the granular movement data of people around the world, harvested from innocuous-seeming apps, Motherboard has learned. The most popular app among a group Motherboard analyzed connected to this sort of data sale is a Muslim prayer and Quran app that has more than 98 million downloads worldwide. Others include a Muslim dating app, a popular Craigslist app, an app for following storms, and a “level” app that can be used to help, for example, install shelves in a bedroom.

This isn’t new, this isn’t just data of non-US citizens, and this isn’t the US military. We have lots of instances where the government buys data that it cannot legally collect itself.

Some app developers Motherboard spoke to were not aware who their users’ location data ends up with, and even if a user examines an app’s privacy policy, they may not ultimately realize how many different industries, companies, or government agencies are buying some of their most sensitive data. U.S. law enforcement purchase of such information has raised questions about authorities buying their way to location data that may ordinarily require a warrant to access. But the USSOCOM contract and additional reporting is the first evidence that U.S. location data purchases have extended from law enforcement to military agencies.