Posts tagged ‘trend micro’

Krebs on Security: Be Wary of ‘Order Confirmation’ Emails

This post was syndicated from: Krebs on Security and was written by: BrianKrebs. Original post: at Krebs on Security

If you receive an email this holiday season asking you to “confirm” an online e-commerce order or package shipment, please resist the urge to click the included link or attachment: Malware purveyors and spammers are blasting these missives by the millions each day in a bid to trick people into giving up control over their computers and identities.

An "order confirmation" malware email blasted out by the Asprox spam botnet recently.

An “order confirmation” malware email blasted out by the Asprox spam botnet recently.

Seasonal scams like these are a perennial scourge of the holidays, mainly because the methods they employ are reliably successful. Crooks understand that it’s easier to catch would-be victims off-guard during the holidays. This goes even for people who generally know better than to click on links and attachments in emails that spoof trusted brands and retailers, because this is a time of year when many people are intensely focused on making sure their online orders arrive before Dec. 25.

This Asprox malware email poses as a notice about a wayward package from a WalMart  order.

This Asprox malware email poses as a notice about a wayward package from a WalMart order.

According to Malcovery, a company that closely tracks email-based malware attacks, these phony “order confirmation” spam campaigns began around Thanksgiving, and use both booby-trapped links and attached files in a bid to infect recipients’ Windows PCs with the malware that powers the Asprox spam botnet.

Asprox is a nasty Trojan that harvests email credentials and other passwords from infected machines, turns the host into a zombie for relaying junk email (such as the pharmaceutical spam detailed in my new book Spam Nation), and perpetuates additional Asprox malware attacks. Asprox also deploys a scanning module that forces hacked PCs to scan websites for vulnerabilities that can be used to hack the sites and foist malware on visitors to that site. For an exhaustive and fairly recent analysis of Asprox, see this writeup (PDF) from Trend Micro.

Target is among the many brands being spoofed by Asprox this holiday season.

Target is among the many brands being spoofed by Asprox this holiday season.

Malcovery notes that the Asprox spam emails use a variety of subject lines, including “Acknowledgment of Order,” “Order Confirmation,” “Order Status,” “Thank you for buying from [insert merchant name here]”, and a “Thank you for your order.”

If you receive an email from a recognized brand that references an issue with an online or in-store order and you think it might be legitimate, do not click the embedded links or attachment. Instead, open up a Web browser and visit the merchant site in question. Generally speaking, legitimate communications about order issues will reference an order number and/or some other data points specific to the transaction — information that can be used to look up the order status at the merchant’s Web site. I know I’m probably preaching to the choir for the loyal readers of this site, but I’m sure most of you have friends and relatives who could use a reminder about all of this. Please feel free to forward them a link to this story.

The Hacker Factor Blog: Downward Trend

This post was syndicated from: The Hacker Factor Blog and was written by: The Hacker Factor Blog. Original post: at The Hacker Factor Blog

Over the last few months, I have been enhancing my network defenses at FotoForensics. It is no longer enough to just block bad actors. I want to know who is attacking me, what is their approach and any other information. I want to “know my enemy”.

To gain more knowledge, I’ve begun to incorporate DNS blacklist data. There are dozens of servers out there that use DNS to query various non-network databases. Rather than resolving a hostname to a network address, they encode an address in the hostname and return a code that denotes the type of threat.

This becomes extremely useful when identifying a network attacker. Is the attack personal, or is it a known bot that is attacking everyone on the Internet? Is it an isolated system, or part of a larger network? Is it coming directly, or hiding behind an anonymous proxy network? Today, FotoForensics just identifies attacks. Tomorrow it will identify attackers.

Reputation at Stake

Beyond DNS lookup systems, there are some reputation-based query services. While the DNS blocklist (dnsbl) services are generally good, the web based reputation systems vary in quality. Many of them seem to be so inaccurate or misleading as to be borderline snake oil.

Back in 2012, I wrote about Websense and how their system really failed to work. This time, I decided to look at Trend Micro.

The Trend Micro Site Safety system takes a URL and tells you whether it is known hostile or not. It even classifies the type of service, such as shopping, social, or adult content.

To test this system, I used FotoForensics as the URL.

According to them, my server has never been evaluated before and they would evaluate it now. I looked at my logs and, yes, I saw them query my site: – – [05/Oct/2014:06:35:45 -0500] “GET / HTTP/1.1″ 200 139 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)” – – [05/Oct/2014:06:52:05 -0500] “GET / HTTP/1.1″ 200 139 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)”

The first thing I noticed is that it never crawled my site. It only looked at the opening page. They downloaded no images, ignored the CSS, and didn’t look anywhere else for text to analyze. This is the same mistake that Websense made.

The second thing I noticed was the lie: They say that they have never looked at my site before. Let’s look back at my site’s web logs. The site was publicly announced on February 9, 2012. – – [10/Feb/2012:03:28:56 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [10/Feb/2012:05:55:32 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [10/Feb/2012:12:16:30 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [10/Feb/2012:12:16:34 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [10/Feb/2012:23:21:51 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [11/Feb/2012:06:51:29 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [14/Feb/2012:02:00:48 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [14/Feb/2012:03:24:48 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)” – – [14/Feb/2012:03:25:51 -0600] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 1865 “-” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)”

All of these network addresses are Trend Micro. According to my logs, they visit my site and the “/” URI often. Usually multiple times per day. There were 1,073 visits in 2012, 4,443 visits in 2013, and over 2,463 (so far) in 2014. So I certainly do not believe them when their page says that they have never visited the site before.

Since they clearly scanned my site, I wanted to see the results. I rechecked their service an hour later, a few hours later, and over a day later. They still report it as being untested.

Uploading Content

Trend Micro first got my attention back in 2012, when they were automatically banned for uploading porn to FotoForensics. What happened: someone using Trend Micro’s reputation software uploaded porn to FotoForensics. A few seconds later, the reputation system checked the URL and ended up uploading the same porn, resulting in an automatic ban.

This second upload happened because Trend Micro was checking a GET request. And in this case, the GET was used to upload a URL containing porn to my site.

Besides performing a double upload, these duplicate requests can cause other problems. You know all of those online shopping sites that say “Do not reload or your credit card may be charged a second time”? Trend Micro might cause that second click since they resubmit URLs.

I also noticed that Trend Micro’s reputation checker would occasionally upload URL-based attacks to my site. It appears that some bad guys may be using the reputation checker to proxy attacks. This way, if the attack succeeds then the bad guy can get in. And if it is noticed, then the sysadmins would blame Trend Micro. (These attacks stand out in my logs because Trend Micro uploads a URL that nobody else uploads.)

I tried to report these issues to Trend Micro. Back in 2012, I had a short email exchange with them that focused on the porn uploads. (The reply basically disregarded the concern.) Later, in 2013, I provided more detail about the proxy abuses to a Trend Micro employee during a trip to California. But nothing was ever done about it.

After-the-Fact Scanning

One of the biggest issues that I have with Trend Micro’s reputation system is the order of events.

In my logs, I can see a user visiting a unique URL recorded in my logs. Shortly after the visit, Trend Micro visits the same URL. This means that the user was allowed to visit the site before the reputation was checked. If the site happens to be hostile or contains undesirable content, then the user would be alerted after the fact. If the site hosts malware, then you’re infected long before Trend Micro would alert you of the risk.

To put it bluntly: if Trend Micro is going to be warning users based on a site’s reputation, then shouldn’t the warning come before the user is granted access to the site?

Quality of Reporting

Trend Micro permits users to submit URLs and see the site’s reputation. I decided to spot-check their system. I submitted some friendly sites, some known to be hostile, and some that host adult content… Here are some of the results:

  • Trend Micro: “Safe.”

  • Symantec: “Safe.”
  • Google: “Safe.”
  • Craigslist: “Safe.” Really? Craigslist? Perhaps they didn’t scan some of the escort listings. I gave it the URL to Craigslist “Washington, DC personals”. (I had searched Google for ‘craigslist escorts’ and this was the first result. Thanks DC!) This URL is anything but family friendly. There are subjects like “Sub Bottom Seeking Top/Master for Use and Domination” and “Sunday Closeted Discreet Afternoon Delight”. The Trend Micro result? “Safe”. They classified it as “Shopping” and not adult content.
  • Super T[redacted] (a known porn site). Trend Micro said “Safe” but classified it as “Pornography”. This is a great result and gives me hope for Trend Micro’s system.
  • Singapore Girls. “Safe” and “Adult / Mature Content”. Most other services classify this as a porn site. I wonder where they draw the line between pornography and mature content…
  • Backpage: “Safe, Newsgroups, Shopping, Travel”. I then uploaded the link to their escorts page, which has some explicit nudity and lots of adult content. The result? Safe, Newsgroups, Shopping, Travel. Not even an “18”, “Adult”, or “Mature Content” rating.
  • “Safe, Sports”. I’ll agree with this. It’s a forum for bicycle enthusiasts.
  • 4chan: “Dangerous, Disease Vector”. According to Trend Micro, “Dangerous” means the site hosts malware or phishing. 4chan is not a phishing site, and I have never seen malware hosted at 4chan. While 4chan users may not be friendly, the site does not host malware. This strikes me as a gross misclassification. It should probably be “Safe, 18+, Adult Content, Social Network”.
  • >_: One of 4chan’s channels goes by the name “/b/”. If you see someone talking about “/b/”, then you know they are talking about 4chan’s random topics channel. Outside of 4chan, other forums have their own symbolic names. If you don’t know the site represented by “&gt_”, then that’s your problem — I’m not going to list the name here. This is a German picture sharing site that has more porn than 4chan. While 4chan has some channels that are close to family friendly, the >_ site is totally not safe for work. Trend Micro says “Safe, Blog/Web Communications”. They say nothing about adult content; if Trend Micro thinks 4chan is “dangerous”, then >_ should be at least as dangerous.

With Filename Ballistics, I have been able to map out a lot of sites that use custom filename formats. A side effect is that I know which sites host mostly family friendly content, and which do not. I submitted enough URLs to Trend Micro’s reputation system that they began to prompt me with a captcha to make sure I’m human. The good news is that they knew most of the sites. The bad news is that they missed a lot of the sites that host adult content and malware.

For a comparison, I tested a few of these sites against McAfee’s SiteAdvisor. McAffee actually scanned FotoForensics and reported “This link is safe. We tested it and didn’t find any significant security issues.” They classified it as “Media Sharing”. (I’ll agree with that.) McAfee also reports that 4chan is suspicious and a “parked domain” (WTF?), they reported that >_ wasn’t tested, Craigslist is a safe (no malware) site with “Forum/Bulletin Boards”, and Singapore Girls is “Safe: Provocative Attire”.

Other Lookup Tools

Trend Micro also has an IP address reputation tool. This is supposed to be used to identify whether an address is associated with known spammers, malware, or other online attacks.

At FotoForensics, I’ve been actively detecting, and in some cases blocking, hostile network addresses. I use a combination of a custom intrusion detection system and known DNS Blacklist services. This has dramatically cut down on the number of attacks and other abuses against my site.

I uploaded a couple of network addresses to Trend Micro in order to see how they assigned reputations:

  • The Honeynet Project reports “Suspicious behavior, Comment spammer”. reports “Service abuse (spam, web attacks)”. My own system identified this as a TOR node. Trend Micro reports: “Unlisted in the spam sender list”.

  • This is another Suspicious behavior, Comment spammer, TOR node. Trend Micro fails to identify it.
  • Honeynet Project says “Search engine, Link crawler”. My system identifies it as Googlebot. Trend Micro says “Unlisted in the spam sender list”. This looks like their generic message for “not in any of our databases”.

    Keep in mind, tracking TOR nodes is really easy. If you run a TOR client, then your client automatically downloads the TOR node list. For me, I just start up a client, download the list, and kill the client without ever using TOR. This gives me a large list of TOR nodes and I can just focus on the exit nodes.

    At minimum, every TOR node should be associated with “Suspicious behavior”. This is not because users using TOR are suspicious. Rather, it is because there are too many attackers who use TOR for anonymity. As a hosting site, I don’t know who is coming from TOR and the odds of it being an attacker or spammer are very high compared to non-TOR users.

  • This system actively attacked my site. Trend Micro reports “Bad: DUL”. As they define it, “the Dynamic User List (DUL) includes IP addresses in dynamic ranges identified by ISPs. Most legitimate mail sources have static IP addresses.”

    A Dynamic User List (aka Dialup User List), contains known subnets that are dynamically assigned by ISPs to their customers. These lists are highly controversial. On one hand, they force ISPs to regulate all email and take responsibility for reducing spam. On the other hand, this approach ends up blacklisting a quarter in the Internet. In effect, users must send email through their ISP’s system and users are treated as spammers before ever sending an email.

    If this sounds like the Net Neutrality debate, then you’re right — it is. Net neutrality means that ISPs cannot filter spam; all packets are equal, including spam. Without neutrality, ISPs are forced to help mitigate spam.

    The good news is, Trend Micro noticed that this was an untrustworthy address. The bad news is that they classified it because it was a dynamic address and not because they actually noticed it doing anything hostile.

  • This system scanned my site for vulnerabilities. The Honeynet Project says “Suspicious behavior, Comment spammer”. reports “Service abuse (spam, web attacks)”. Trend Micro? “Unlisted in the spam sender list”.

Alright… so maybe Trend Micro is only looking for spammers… Let’s submit some IP addresses from spam that I recently received.

  • Other systems report: Suspicious behavior, Comment spammer, Known proxy, Service abuse (spam, web attacks), Network attack. Trend Micro reports “Bad: DUL”. Again, Trend Micro flagged it because it is a dynamic address and not because they noticed it doing anything bad.

  • None of the services, including Trend Micro, identify it. As far as I can tell, anything from is spam. This range currently accounts for a solid 30% of all spam to my own honeypot addresses.
  • The blacklist services that I use found nothing. JP SURBL identifies it as a spammer’s address. Trend Micro reports it as “Bad: QIL”. According to them, the Quick IP Lookup Database (QIL) stores known addresses used by botnets.

    Botnets typically consist of a wide range of compromised computers that work together as a unit. If you map botnet nodes to geolocations, you will usually see them all over and not limited to a specific subnet. In contrast to botnets, many spammers acquire large sequential ranges of network addresses (subnets) from unsuspecting (or uncaring) hosting sites. They use the addresses for spending spam. While these spam systems may be remotely controlled, the tight cluster is usually not managed like a botnet.

    According to my own spam collection, this specific address is part of spam network that spans multiple subnets ( – and Each subnet runs a different mailing campaign and they are constantly sending spam. This same spammer recently added another subnet:, which includes the previous address.

    This spammer has been active for months, and Trend Micro flags it. However, they identify it as “Bad: QIL”. As far as I can tell, this address is not part of a botnet (as identified by QIL). Instead, this spammer signs up with various hosting sites and spams like crazy until getting booted out.

  • Most services, including Trend Micro, missed this. Barracuda Central was the only one to identify this as a spammer.
  • This spammer is listed in the blacklist, but Trend Micro does not identify it.
  • I caught this address searching my site for email addresses and sending me spam. It is both a harvester and a spammer. This network address is listed in 7 different spam blacklists. Trend Micro reports it as a botnet (Bad: QIL), but it’s actually part of a sequential set of network addresses (a subnet) used by a spammer.
  • This address is detected by, but not Trend Micro.

I certainly cannot fault Trend Micro for failing to identify most of the addresses used for spam. Of the 27 public spam blacklists and the three other blacklists that I checked, all of them had high false-negative rates and failed to associate most addresses with spam. Every blacklist seems to have their own tiny, independent set of addresses and there is little overlap. However, Trend Micro’s subset seems to be significantly smaller than other blacklists. The best ones based on my own testing are and

In general, Trend Micro seems correct about the addresses that it flags as hostile — as long as you ignore the cause. Unfortunately, Trend Micro doesn’t know many addresses. You should expect a high false-positive rate due to generic inclusions, and a high false-negative rate (Type-II error) due to their small database. Moreover, many of their matches appear to be caught by generic rules that classify large swaths of addresses as hostile without any proof, rather than any actual detection. This means Trend Micro has a high degree of Type-III errors: correct by coincidence. Finally, Trend Micro seems to classify any network of spam systems as a “botnet”, even when they are not botnets.

About Trend Micro

Trend Micro offers many products. Their anti-virus software is as good as any. But that’s not saying much. As Trend Micro’s CEO Eva Chen said in 2008, “I’ve been feeling that the anti-virus industry sucks. If you have 5.5 million new viruses out there how can you claim this industry is doing the right job?”

Virtually the entire AV industry is reactive. First they detect an outbreak, then then evaluate the problem and create a detector. This means that the attackers always have the advantage: they can create new malware faster than the AV companies can detect and react. The move toward a reputation-based system as a predictor is a good preventative approach.

Unfortunately, Trend Micro seems to have seriously dropped the ball. Their system lies about whether a site has been checked and they validate the site after the user has accessed it. They usually report incorrect information, and when they are right, it seems due more to coincidence than accuracy.

I do believe that a profiling system integrated with a real-time detector is a great proactive alternative. However, Trend Micro’s offerings lack the necessary accuracy, dependability, and reputation. As I reflect on Eva Chen’s statement, I can only conclude one thing: it’s been six years, and they still suck.

Krebs on Security: Home Depot Hit By Same Malware as Target

This post was syndicated from: Krebs on Security and was written by: BrianKrebs. Original post: at Krebs on Security

The apparent credit and debit card breach uncovered last week at Home Depot was aided in part by a new variant of the same malicious software program that stole card account data from cash registers at Target last December, according to sources close to the investigation.

Photo: Nicholas Eckhart

Photo: Nicholas Eckhart

On Tuesday, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that Home Depot was working with law enforcement to investigate “unusual activity” after multiple banks said they’d traced a pattern of card fraud back to debit and credit cards that had all been used at Home Depot locations since May of this year.

A source close to the investigation told this author that an analysis revealed at least some of Home Depot’s store registers had been infected with a new variant of “BlackPOS” (a.k.a. “Kaptoxa”), a malware strain designed to siphon data from cards when they are swiped at infected point-of-sale systems running Microsoft Windows.

The information on the malware adds another indicator that those responsible for the as-yet unconfirmed breach at Home Depot also were involved in the December 2013 attack on Target that exposed 40 million customer debit and credit card accounts. BlackPOS also was found on point-of-sale systems at Target last year. What’s more, cards apparently stolen from Home Depot shoppers first turned up for sale on Rescator[dot]cc, the same underground cybercrime shop that sold millions of cards stolen in the Target attack.

Clues buried within this newer version of BlackPOS support the theory put forth by multiple banks that the Home Depot breach may involve compromised store transactions going back at least several months. In addition, the cybercrime shop Rescator over the past few days pushed out nine more large batches of stolen cards onto his shop, all under the same “American Sanctions” label assigned to the first two batches of cards that originally tipped off banks to a pattern of card fraud that traced back to Home Depot. Likewise, the cards lifted from Target were sold in several dozen batches released over a period of three months on Rescator’s shop.

The cybercrime shop Rescator[dot]cc pushed out nine new batches of cards from the same "American Sanctions" base of cards that banks traced back to Home Depot.

The cybercrime shop Rescator[dot]cc pushed out nine new batches of cards from the same “American Sanctions” base of cards that banks traced back to Home Depot.


The tip from a source about BlackPOS infections found at Home Depot comes amid reports from several security firms about the discovery of a new version of BlackPOS. On Aug. 29, Trend Micro published a blog post stating that it had identified a brand new variant of BlackPOS in the wild that was targeting retail accounts. Trend said the updated version, which it first spotted on Aug. 22, sports a few notable new features, including an enhanced capability to capture card data from the physical memory of infected point-of-sale devices. Trend said the new version also has a feature that disguises the malware as a component of the antivirus product running on the system.

Contents of the new BlackPOS component responsible for exfiltrating stolen cards from the network. Source: Trend Micro.

Contents of the new BlackPOS component responsible for exfiltrating stolen cards from the network. Source: Trend Micro.

Trend notes that the new BlackPOS variant uses a similar method to offload stolen card data as the version used in the attack on Target.

“In one the biggest data breach[es] we’ve seen in 2013, the cybercriminals behind it offloaded the gathered data to a compromised server first while a different malware running on the compromised server uploaded it to the FTP,” wrote Trend’s Rhena Onocencio. “We surmise that this new BlackPOS malware uses the same exfiltration tactic.”

An Internet search on the unique malware “hash” signature noted in Trend’s malware writeup indicates that the new BlackPOS verison was created on June 22, 2014, and that as late as Aug. 15, 2014 only one of more than two-dozen anti-malware tools (McAfee) detected it as malicious.


Other clues in the new BlackPOS malware variant further suggest a link between the cybercrooks behind the apparent breach at Home Depot and the hackers who hit Target. The new BlackPOS variant includes several interesting text strings. Among those are five links to Web sites featuring content about America’s role in foreign conflicts, particularly in Libya and Ukraine.

One of the images linked to in the guts of the BlackPOS code.

One of the images linked to in the guts of the BlackPOS code.

Three of the links point to news, editorial articles and cartoons that accuse the United States of fomenting war and unrest in the name of Democracy in Ukraine, Syria, Egypt and Libya. One of the images shows four Molotov cocktails with the flags of those four nations on the bottles, next to a box of matches festooned with the American flag and match ready to strike. Another link leads to an image of the current armed conflict in Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists.

This is interesting given what we know about Rescator, the individual principally responsible for running the store that is selling all of these stolen credit and debit cards. In the wake of the Target breach, I traced a long list of clues from Rescator’s various online identities back to a young programmer in Odessa, Ukraine. In his many personas, Rescator identified himself as a member of the Lampeduza cybercrime forum, and indeed this site is where he alerts customers about new batches of stolen cards.

As I discovered in my profile of Rescator, he and his crew seemed somewhat taken with the late despotic Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, although they prefer the phonetic spelling of his name. The Web site kaddafi[dot]hk was among four main carding shops run by Rescator’s crew (it has since been retired and merged with Rescator[dot]cc). The domain kaddafi[dot]me was set up to serve as an instant message Jabber server for cybercrooks, advertising its lack of logging and record keeping as a reason crooks should trust kaddafi[dot]me to handle their private online communications.

When I reached out to Rescator last December to obtain comment about my findings on his apparent role in the Target break-in, I received an instant message reply from the Jabber address “kaddafi@kaddafi[dot]me” (in that conversation, the person chatting with me from that address offered to pay me $10,000 if I did not run that story; I declined). But I also discovered that the kaddafi[dot]me domain was a blog of sorts that hosted some harsh and frankly chilling anti-American propaganda.

The entire three-part manifesto posted on the kaddafi[dot]me home page is no longer available, but a professionally translated snippet of this tirade reads:

“The movement of our Republic, the ideology of Lampeduza – is the opposition to Western countries, primarily targeting the restoration of the balance of forces in the world. After the collapse of the USSR, we have lost this fragile equilibrium face of the planet. We – the Senate and the top people of the Republic are not just fighting for survival and our place under the sun, we are driven by the idea! The idea, which is ​​living in all of us – to return all that was stolen and taken from our friendly countries grain by grain! We are fighting for a good cause! Hot blood is flowing in us, in citizens, who want to change situation in the world. We do not bend to other people’s opinions and desires, and give an adequate response to the Western globalism. It is essential to be a fighter for justice!

Perhaps we would be living completely differently now, if there had not been the plan of Allen Dulles, and if America had not invested billions in the collapse of the USSR. We were deprived of a common homeland, but not deprived of unity, have found our borders, and are even closer to each other. We saw the obvious principles of capitalism, where man to a man is a wolf [[see here for more context on this metaphor]]. Together, we can do a lot to bring back all the things that we have been deprived of because of America! We will be heard!

Citizens of Lampeduza – “free painters” ready to create and live the idea for the good of the Motherland — let’s first bend them over, and then insert deeper!!!

Google-translated version of Kaddafi[dot]me homepage.

Google-translated version of Kaddafi[dot]me homepage.